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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ESTATE OF JUAN BONILLA, JR.; EVERLIDIS BONILLA,  




CITY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA; YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
OFFICER CHRISTOPHER ROOSEN; TOWNSHIP OF WEST MANCHESTER;  
WEST MANCHESTER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
OFFICER MICHAEL JORDAN 
 
      EVERLIDIS BONILLA, individually & as Personal Representative  
      for the Estate of Juan Bonilla, Jr.,  




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-14-cv-02238) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2017 
 
Before:  McKEE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 





                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent 




FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
The plaintiff-appellants, the estate of the deceased Juan Bonilla, Jr. and his 
personal representative, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the defendant-
appellees, the City of York, the Township of West Manchester, and two police officers,1 
alleging that the defendants wrongfully used deadly force against the decedent.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the police 
officers’ use of deadly force to subdue the decedent, who had fired shots in a crowded 
nightclub, was reasonable.  The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that genuine issues of 
material fact remain as to the sequence of events that led to the fatal shooting.  Because 
we conclude that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the officers 
used reasonable force, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.     
I. 
On November 24, 2012, at around 2 a.m., Bonilla opened fire in a nightclub 
known as “Ada’s” in York, Pennsylvania.  Officers Roosen and Jordan were the first to 
respond to police dispatch calls and arrived at the scene shortly thereafter.  As a result of 
Bonilla’s gunfire, patrons of Ada’s began to stream out of the nightclub and into the 
parking lot outside to retrieve their cars and escape from the scene.  Bonilla also exited 
the club at this time and continued to fire gunshots outside Ada’s, with the intent of 
hitting a specific individual who was running south through the parking lot.   
                                                          
1 One of the police officers worked for the York City Police Department and the other 
worked for the West Manchester Police Department.  J.A. 4-5.  
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What occurred next is subject to some dispute.  The officers claim that they 
observed Bonilla running southward after a minivan that was driving out of the parking 
lot and shooting at it.  Fearing for the immediate safety of those in the minivan, Officer 
Roosen began to shoot at Bonilla’s back in order to subdue him.  Bonilla was apparently 
struck by Officer Roosen’s bullets, and, as a result, he stumbled to the left, threw his arms 
up, and dropped his gun.  Officer Roosen testified that he stopped shooting at Bonilla 
once he saw Bonilla drop his gun, since he was no longer a threat.  Officer Jordan 
apparently did not see that Bonilla had dropped his gun because his line of vision was 
obscured by a van.  He continued to pursue Bonilla when Bonilla fell, face down, on the 
grassy median in the middle of the parking lot, with his hands pinned underneath his 
body.  Officer Jordan continued to command him to “show me your hands.”2  Bonilla 
rose slightly off the ground at this command, and yelled, in an agitated fashion, “yo, yo, 
really,” before falling back down.3   Officer Jordan yelled at him again to raise his hands, 
and when he failed to do so a second time, Officer Jordan shot at his torso.  Officer 
Jordan appeared to have missed this shot.  Bonilla then extracted his arms from 
underneath him.  Seeing that Bonilla was unarmed at this time, Officer Jordan walked 
over to his person and called for emergency medical services.  Ultimately, Bonilla died 
on the scene.  
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that Bonilla did not use his weapon once 
he moved to the southern portion of the parking lot and that he did not shoot at any 
                                                          
2 J.A. 90.  
3 J.A. 188; J.A. 281.   
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minivans, but was merely running next to one.  According to one club-goer, the officers 
commanded Bonilla to drop his gun.  Bonilla complied with this command, dropped his 
gun, and turned around to face the officers.  Nonetheless, the officers shot at him even as 
he began to walk towards the officers, “as if he were surrendering.”4  The eyewitness also 
claimed that there were no vans in the parking lot that could have obscured Officer 
Jordan’s view of Bonilla.   
On the day of the incident, the Pennsylvania State Police began an investigation of 
Bonilla’s death.  The investigation concluded that Bonilla suffered two gunshot 
wounds—one through his chest entering from the back and the other in his left thigh 
entering from the front.  The gunshot to the back and chest was the cause of death.  A 
ballistic report found that the fatal shot was not discharged from Officer Jordan’s gun.   
Nearly two years after this incident, on November 21, 2014, the plaintiffs brought 
ten claims under Section 1983 against the defendants.  The complaint alleges unlawful 
use of deadly force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and state law claims for 
assault and battery, wrongful death, and survival action against the two officers.  It also 
alleges that the City of York and the West Manchester Township violated the Fourth 
Amendment by failing to properly train the officers on the use of deadly force.5  After ten 
months of discovery, the defendants separately moved for summary judgment.  The 
plaintiffs opposed the summary judgment motions and also moved for leave to file an 
amended complaint.  The District Court granted the defendants’ summary judgment 
                                                          
4 J.A. 372.   
5 The complaint also named the York City Police Department and the West Manchester 
Police Department as defendants, but they were dismissed.   
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motions and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint.6  Pending 
before the Court is the plaintiffs’ appeal of these two rulings.7  
II. 
 On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court made two errors: that it 
should not have granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the record and 
that it should have permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.  We will address 
each of these challenges in turn. 
 The crux of the plaintiffs’ claims is that the two police officers used excessive 
force in subduing Bonilla, in violation of both the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania 
state law.  The primary inquiry in excessive force cases is determining whether “the 
officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 
                                                          
6 The District Court, in the same opinion, also decided on two motions in limine and a 
Daubert motion.  None of these are appealed.   
7 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “[O]ur review of a grant of 
summary judgment is plenary, and in making that review we use the same standard as a 
district court: whether there are genuine issues of material fact precluding entry of 
summary judgment.” Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 
(3d Cir. 2009).  “A fact is ‘material’ if it could affect the outcome, and an issue of 
material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return 
a verdict for the non-moving party.”  Johnson v. City of Phila., 837 F.3d 343, 349 n.30 
(3d Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).   
“[W]e review a Rule 15 motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion . . 
. . Under such a review, we are cognizant of Rule 15’s admonition that leave to amend 
should be freely given ‘when justice so requires.’”  U.S. ex rel. Customs Fraud 
Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).  A court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on “an erroneous 
view of the law.”  Id. at 249 (quoting Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748, n.2 (2014)).    
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confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivations.”8  Therefore, 
the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment and state law claims rise and fall together.  
Factors that we consider when determining whether such force is reasonable 
include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat 
to the safety of the officers or others, [] whether he is actively resisting arrest or 
attempting to evade arrest by flight,”9 “the duration of the action, whether the action takes 
place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, 
and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.”10  
Furthermore, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight.”11  The court must make “allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 12   
   Applying this standard, the District Court found that the deadly force used by the 
two officers was reasonable.  The incident occurred in the middle of the night, outside a 
nightclub that was known for being particularly dangerous, and Bonilla was an active 
shooter in pursuit of his victim and shooting into a parking lot, where about twenty to 
                                                          
8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 
293 (Pa. 1994) (“A police officer may use reasonable force to prevent interference with 
the exercise of his authority or the performance of his duty. . . . The reasonableness of the 
force used in making the arrest determines whether the police officer’s conduct 
constitutes an assault and battery.”).   
9 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
10 Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 2004).   
11 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
12 Id. at 397.    
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thirty patrons of the nightclub were getting into cars in order to flee the scene.  The 
officers fired at Bonilla precisely because they knew that he was could, and in fact tried 
to, harm bystanders at the scene.  
 The plaintiffs counter that at least two factual disputes exist such that summary 
judgment was improvidently granted.  We disagree.  First, plaintiffs argue that the fatal 
shot to the chest could have been fired by Officer Jordan after Bonilla dropped his gun 
and had fallen onto the grassy median.  However, the plaintiffs offer no evidence to rebut 
the convincing evidence produced by the defendants that the fatal shot to the chest could 
not have been fired from Officer Jordan’s gun.  During autopsy, a deformed bullet was 
recovered from the front of Bonilla’s sweatshirt.  That bullet was tested and determined 
that it could not have been discharged from Officer Jordan’s gun.  No other bullets were 
recovered from either Bonilla’s person or the grassy median.  From this, the District 
Court concluded that Officer Jordan could not have been responsible for the fatal shot.  
The plaintiffs offer no rebuttal evidence except supposition that the bullet recovered from 
Bonilla’s sweatshirt was not the fatal bullet—without demonstrating how else it could 
have gotten onto the sweatshirt or where else the fatal bullet could be found.   
The plaintiffs’ unsupported speculation here is insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact.  As we have said previously, “summary judgment is essentially 
‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party: [it] must rebut the motion with facts in 
the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, 
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or oral argument.” 13  Accordingly, we do not find that the plaintiffs have raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the fatal shot was fired while Bonilla was unarmed 
and laying on the grassy median. 
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred by failing to take into 
account the deposition testimony of an eyewitness, who testified that Bonilla was shot 
after he had already dropped his gun and began walking, with his hands raised, toward 
Officer Roosen.  The District Court found that the deposition testimony of this 
eyewitness failed to create a genuine issue of material fact because her “testimony is so 
inconsistent as to be wholly unreliable.”14  Indeed, at one point the eyewitness testified 
that she saw Bonilla “turn[] around, put his gun down and was walking towards the 
police officer,” with his hands raised, when the “police officer shot him in the left leg,”15 
and Bonilla fell immediately onto his left knee on the grassy median.16  Yet, she admitted 
that when she first spoke to the police investigator—over a year and a half before the 
deposition—she told the investigator she was unable to recall at that time if the officer 
shot Bonilla before or after he dropped his gun and put his hands up because “so much 
[was] going on.”17   
                                                          
13 Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must 
support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 
stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . .”). 
14 J.A. 1147.  
15 J.A. 702.  
16 J.A. 706. 
17 J.A. 715.   
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Even crediting this eyewitness testimony, however, we cannot find that it creates 
any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officers used reasonable force 
when they shot at Bonilla.  The eyewitness testimony, if we are to believe it in its 
entirely, establishes the following facts: Bonilla was running south across the parking lot, 
with his back to the officers, until he decided to heed the officers’ command to drop his 
gun.  He stopped, tossed his gun, and put his hands up and turned around to face the 
officers as if to surrender himself.  At around this time the officers continued to shoot at 
him until he was hit and stumbled onto the grassy median.  The eyewitness testimony, 
however, does not establish the sequence of events.  She could not recall if Bonilla was 
shot first or if he surrendered first.  This testimony is, at best, no more than a “scintilla of 
evidence,” which is “insufficient” to survive summary judgment.18   
But even if we were to believe, though the eyewitness testimony alone does not 
support it, that the officers shot at Bonilla after he was unarmed, we still cannot find that 
a reasonable juror would think the officers’ actions were unreasonable.  We know from 
the autopsy report that the fatal shot to the chest entered from the back, and the shot to 
the leg entered from the front.  Thus, in the scenario most favorable to the plaintiffs, 
Bonilla was fatally shot after he tossed his gun and put his hands up but before he had 
time to turn around.  This, in and of itself, does not render the officers’ actions 
unreasonable.  Viewing the facts, as we must, from the perspective of the officers on the 
scene at the time, Bonilla was an active shooter who not only fired at people inside the 
club but continued to shoot at bystanders outside of the club.  In fact, he was still running 
                                                          
18 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.  
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after his victim across the parking lot as the police officers closed in on him.  The officers 
may have continued to shoot at him in the seconds after he decided to surrender and turn 
around.  However, given the circumstances at the time—the early hour, the dark light, the 
number of bystanders, and the danger presented by Bonilla—we believe it reasonable that 
the officers did not wait to see if Bonilla actually heeded their commands before they 
stopped shooting.  As the eyewitness herself testified, there was a lot of “commotion” at 
the time, and she herself could not remember the exact sequence of events—whether 
Bonilla dropped his gun first or whether he was shot first.19  This is precisely the difficult 
situation in which the Supreme Court has admonished us to make “allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.” 20  Consequently, we agree with the District Court 
that this eyewitness testimony did not create a genuine issue of material fact.21   
For the same reason, we will also affirm the District Court’s decision to deny the 
plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint to add an allegation that the officers 
used excessive force when they shot Bonilla in the left leg.  While permission to amend 
should be freely given, the District Court may deny a motion for leave to amend if “the 
                                                          
19 J.A. 719; J.A. 715; J.A. 721-22.   
20 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.    
21 Since we find that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the 
plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the City of York and West Manchester Township, based 
on their failure to adequately train the two officers on the proper use of deadly force, 
must also be dismissed.   
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amendment would be futile.”22  As we explained, under the circumstances and from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time, the officers were not 
unreasonable to have shot Bonilla in the leg, even if he had been unarmed at the time.  
Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ 
motion for leave to amend.  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.   
                                                          
22 Customs Fraud Investigations, 839 F.3d at 249 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. 
Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014)).  
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